“Why Should I Be Moral?”
George I. Mavrodes, examines various worldviews in an attempt to answer this basic question.
The first view he analyzed was held by the
Philosopher, Historian, Bertrand Russell.
Bertrand Russell’s worldview is what Mavrodes calls the “Russellian
World,” within A Free Man’s Worship. The most relevant features of this worldview being (1) such phenomena as
minds, mental activities, consciousness, and so forth are the products of
entities and causes that give no indication of being mental themselves. To
Russell, the causes are “accidental collocation of atoms” with “no prevision of
the end they were achieving.” (Robinson pg.77-8) (2) Human life is bounded by physical death and each individual comes
to a permanent end at his physical death. (3) Not only each individual but also
the human race as a species is doomed to extinction “beneath the debris of a
universe in ruins.” (Robinson pg.77-8)
Living in a “Russellian World” would grant “Russellian
benefits”, such as living to an old age, sexual pleasure, or a good reputation.
So could the world be “Russelian?”
In the actual world we experience we do not only have moral
feelings, but as Kant claimed we have moral duties. Actions fall into the
sphere of morality with obligations to act (or refrain from acting) in certain
ways. “N ought to do (or avoid doing)_____” or “It is N’s duty to do (or avoid
doing)____.” (Robinson pg.78)
For Immanuel Kant, in a “Kantian world” we have moral demands that are only reasonable if
reality itself is committed to morality; only if there is a moral demand on the
world and only if reality will satisfy this demand. So by fulfilling our moral
duties we are granted “Kantian benefits” such as going to heaven. For Kant, a
truly moral action is undertaken purely out of respect for the moral law and
with no concern at all for reward in this life.
(The Bhagavad-Gita
also provides an alternative religious account of moral duty within Hinduism).
In a “Russelian World” moral feelings are not weird, but moral obligations are weird because in the actual world we do have moral
obligations that sometimes provide no personal benefit. Thus there is a possibility,
that there is a certain amount of personal danger, or a “Russelian loss,” of
fulfilling moral obligations in a secular world, such as adverse judgment. You
can potentially suffer from fulfilling moral obligations in a “Russellian
World,” although, it does not necessarily follow that just because you fulfill
an obligation you will not benefit from it personally.
Mavrodes examines an argument from Kurt Baier; it is in
everyone’s best interest to be moral which can be applied to Russelian terms.
The argument is as follows; (Robinson pg.84-5)
(A)
It is in everyone’s best interest (including me)
for everyone (even me) to be moral.
(Supported by Thomas Hobbes Leviathan; without morality or a basic
social structure, man lives in a “state of nature,” which is chaotic, brutish,
and short).
(B)
It is in my best interest for everyone
(including me) to be moral.
(C)
It is in my best interest for me to be moral.
Which then comes back to the question as to
“why should I be moral?”
If (C) is true, then moral obligations are not strange.
But Mavrodes states this argument is invalid.
The derivation of (B) from (A)
may be all right, but the derivation of (C) from (B) is invalid and should be
followed by
(C’) It is in
my best interest for me to be moral if everyone else is moral.
This argument runs that in terms of personal interest to be
moral on assumption that everyone else in the world is moral; if I act morally,
then everyone else will.
Now,
(A) “everyone’s best interests” either
collectively or distributive can be taken as the best interests of the whole
group considered as a single unit, or the best interests of each individual
within the group.
If (A) is collective then (B) does not follow. It may not be
in my best interest for me to act morally but perhaps the best interest of the
group is to sacrifice my interest. On this interpretation, the argument does
not answer the question, “Why should I be moral?”
Hobbes may have been right that life in the state of nature
is short, but the fact is some lives are short because of what morality
demands. So, it can be observed if I act immorally then so will other people
but it can also be observed that other people will act immorally regardless of
what I do.
In a “Russelian World” morality would be an “emergent” feature, such
as the wetness of water is an emergent feature, it is not a property of either
hydrogen or oxygen which is the actual composition of water.
We have duties and we can choose to fulfil them and be moral
and refuse them to be immoral-which is absurd by a secular viewpoint. It is
also absurd to propose that by acting morally, everyone will act morally.
Richard Brant asked, “Is it reasonable for me to do my duty
if it conflicts seriously with my personal welfare?” = “Given that doing x is my duty and that doing some
conflicting act y will maximize my
personal welfare, will the performance of x
instead of y satisfy my
reflective preferences better?” (Robinson pg.85-6).
Plato’s view of morality?
Plato seems to have thought that goodness, or something that is related to
morality was the ultimate fact about the world. The Platonic world is more
similar to a religious viewpoint than to a “Russelian” one. Plato, according to
Mavrodes, would not find any validity in the “accidental collocations of atoms”
nor would have taken “so nearly certain,” with any type of certainty. A
Platonic man sets himself to live in accordance with the Good aligns himself
what is most basic in existence. Whatever values a Platonic world imposes are
in which the Platonic world is committed. (Golden Rule; ethic of reciprocity; “Do not unto
another that you would not have him do unto you. Thou needest this law alone.
It is the foundation of all the rest.”- Confucius 500 B.C.E.).
To Mavrodes, Morality may be a vague feature of some deeper feature
that we possibly cannot identify, but the more we give our duties spiritual
qualities the more they can easily “make sense.” But even in the elements of
his own religion, Christianity, have a strange process of “gift and sacrifice”
(you get what you give) and has little to do with rights and duties (rights and
responsibilities), but when we give our obligations any spiritual quality we
are giving our actions value; we are not only responsible for our actions
concerning other individuals, we are also responsible for our actions to a
higher deity or being, (Vishnu/Krishna, Yahweh/Jehovah, Christ, Allah).
What does Breaking Bad
have to do with morality?
The main character in the AMC's show Breaking Bad is Walter White (D.B.A. Heisenberg), a chemistry-teaching, family man that is
diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer. He does not accept charity and claims
that everything he does is for the good of his family. But it is very apparent
that there are few benefits in upholding, as he claims (at least within seasons 1-3) because
it is his duty to provide for his family.
Are his actions justifiable either by “Russelian” or
“Kantian" ?
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